The Importance to CorrectlyAssess the Flammable Hazardsduring Design and OperationIECEx 2018International ConferenceJakarta, Indonesia8th and 9th August 2018
INTRODUCING Ir Mohamad Faizal Hamdan Principal Engineer, Electrical PETRONAS Group Technical Solutions
Objectives To share past experiences on the importance of Hazardous AreaClassification (HAC) assessment in defining the right hazards, rightdesign, and the right selection of equipment in the explosiveatmosphere. The need to control of Hazardous Area Classification in existing plantand infrastructure due to design change, upgrading and/ormodification
#1 Modification done to the operation plant has notconsidered all risks during engineering and propermitigation leading to. HAC not being updated to reflect the impact of the new installation ofFuel Gas Heater by Operation Group The latest fuel source that impact HAC is not communicated toProject Team resulting in improper design solution
#2. Design consideration during engineering was basedon worst case scenario leading to unoptimised solution: Inaccurate in performing HAC e.g Overdesign of battery roomcontaining recombination type of battery The room was design based on worst case scenario i.eVented Lead Acid batteries, resulting in unoptimisedsolution
#3. Incomplete hazardous area classification (HAC)drawings leading to wrong selection of equipment. HAC drawing was interpreted from top view only, resulting in Ex nA motor beingselected instead of Ex de motor
#4. Generalisation of information leading to inaccuraciesof area classification schedule Misinformation within area classification schedule (radius and temperature class) AIT not accurate Temperature class shall be decided based on individual equipment surfacetemperature
#5. Overlook Operational requirement during designstage: No firewall was constructed to demarcate hazardous area contributedby wellhead. Non-hazardous area was not available to place temporary dieselgenerator, welding set and etc.
#6. Mismatch in application of Standards in performingHazardous Area Classification Wrong reference used to perform HAC involving cryogenic facilities i.e IPPart 15 was used as reference. Clause 1.1 of Chapter 1 stated theexclusion of cryogenic facility for the applicability of the Code. HAC involving dust environment is not being assessed or performed i.eHAC was only done for gas sources
#7. Mismatch in application of Standards in performingHazardous Area Classification IP part 15 exclusively used for HAC without cross reference with other standardswhere pipe rack is covered by API 505
Root Causes Competency gap in HAC and Ex related matter Lack of inter-discipline communication process during design stage inHAC assessment and Ex equipment selection requirement. HAC management guidelines was not fully adhered to. Management of Change (MOC) was not fully executed.
Implications Cost to install new Ex Equipment if over-design. Cost to replace non-compliance equipment if inaccurate design Production deferment for non-compliance installation. Operational impact i.e challenges to locate non-Ex equipment supply bycontractor e.g temporary generator, welding sets
Resolutions Execute and fully comply to Ex Management system which includes: Ex Training and Certification Scheme Interdisciplinary communication and review process established Appointment and Authorisation of Ex person Management of Change (MOC) Ex Situational Assessment Ex Documentation
PETRONAS Technical Standards provides guidelines toensure proper Hazardous Area Classification Hazardous Area Classification (Supplement/Amendment to InternationalStandards) IP -15 IEC 60079-10-1 and IEC 60079-10-2 API RP 500 and API RP 505 NFPA 497 and NFPA 499
PETRONAS Technical Standards provides guidelines toensure proper management of Ex Equipment1. Ex Electrical Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Guidelines(Ex IMG) Standards and Guidelines Personnel Inspection Maintenance2. Ex Equipment Repair Guidelines (Ex ERG)3. Ex Management Assessment Guidelines (Ex MAG)4. Ex Equipment Selection Guidelines (ELECTRICAL) (Ex ESG-E)
Where does Hazardous Area and ExEquipment positioned in the contactof Process Safety ?
INTRODUCING Syed Mohamed Nasir Alhabshi Principal Engineer, Process Safety PETRONAS Group Technical Solutions
Major Accident that defines Process Safety
Major Accident Hazard Prevention Identify the asset’s Safety Critical Elements (SCE)Prevent or limit consequences of Major Accident Hazards (MAH) as illustrated below:Safety Critical Elements (hard safety barrier)126.96.36.199.Structural IntegrityProcess ContainmentIgnition ControlDetection Systems188.8.131.52.Protection SystemsShutdown SystemsEmergency ResponsesLifesavingHazardAccidentProcess Safety (soft safety barrier)184.108.40.206.Proprietary & License Technology Assessment (PLTA)Design Integrity (DI)Mechanical Integrity (MI)Ops Procedures (OP)220.127.116.11.Pre-activity Safety Review (PASR)Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Process Safety Information (PSI)Management Of Change (MOC)
Safety Critical Element (SCE)Safety Critical Elements group*Hardware Barriers8 BarriersPreventionControl &MitigationDetectionEmergencyResponseSafeOperation Ballast System Collision Avoidance Cranes Drilling System Mooring System Navigation Aids Onshore & OffshoreStructures*Typical SCE examplesEscalatingconsequence Fired Heaters Multi Cable Transits Heat Exchanger Helicopter Refuel Mechanical Handling Oil Water Control Open Drains Pipeline System Piping System Pressure Vessel Rotating Equipment Tank Tanker Loading Well Containment Wire Line Equipment Hazardous Area Certified ExEquipment HVAC (processarea) Earthing System Flare Tip Ignition Fuel Gas PurgeSystem MiscellaneousIgnition Control Tank Inert System Chemical Injection Deluge System Fire/ExplosionProtection FW Pumps FW Network Fire Fighting System Helideck Form Navigation Aids Power ManagementSystem Safeguarding Loops Sand FilterIntrumenttionMech - Static Security System(Access control, CCTV,Alarm / Detectors etc) Fire and GasDetection System H2O in Condensate(Gas dew point) Blowdown De-pressurisationSystem Drilling Well Control ESD HIPPS Relief Valves Shutoff Valves SSIV Well Isolation CommunicationSystem Emergency Power Emergency/ EscapeLighting Escape & EvacuationRoutes Non-Fixed FireFighting Equipment Helicopter Facilities Process Control Alarm Temporary Refuge UPS Personal SurvivalEquipment Lifeboats Mutual Aid Rescue Facilities Tertiary Means ofEscapeElectricalCivilMech - Rotary20
HAC Assessment Methodology and ApproachThis Key for a correct Area Classification; Fit for Purpose Common Fluid Categories; The application of IP Part 15 - Direct Example and Point SourceApproachDusts; The application of NFPA 499 – Recommended Practice for the Classification ofCombustible Dusts and the application of IEC 60079, Part 10-2; Classification of Area –Combustible Dusts atmospheres – Direct Example ApproachCryogenic Flammable Material with release of 10mm, pressure 100BarA ; ConsequenceModelling via dispersion studyHigh Flash Point material eg; Lubricant. Verify mist formation via Consequence Modellingvia dispersion studyPilot Plant & Lab Scale; The application of relaxation factorsThe application of Risk Assessment to assess the consequences of the ignition of anexplosive atmosphere to determine the used of Ex equipment of a higher protection level(EPL) or lower EPLThe use of Phast Software to perform Consequence Modelling
GTS PSM Product Suites Services
Key milestones within PETRONAS, MEGA Projects & External CompaniesOUR T)SBPP(M)SBPDBPEPIPLISBPGBGDCPC AromaticsPC ODG SBPC Ammonia SBPC LDPE SBPC Ethylene SBPC Fertilizer K SBPC Methanol SBPC MTBE SBPC Polypropylene SBPC Polyethylene SBABF SBDownstreamExternalPCSB-PMOPCSB- amSAMURPFLNGSOGTPC GARRAFMNBRAPIDPCPRGTPDWTMEGA ProjectsKEY ACHIEVEMENTS0 PSM Implementation for PETRONAS Group Wide i.e.downstream & upstream PSM Audits for PETRONAS Group Wide with GHSED PHA, HAZOP, HER for PETRONAS Group Wide Zero Fire assessment & barrier management forPCSB-SKO & VCMSB PSM Training for PETRONAS Group Wide HAZOP Leader Certifications for PETRONAS GroupWide HAC Assessment & Review Workshop EERA Study for PCSB-SKO Temana Toxic Gas Dispersion for PCFKSB, PC LDPE SB Flare Radiation Study for PGB CRM for PCSB-SKO, PP(M)SB, PCMSB LOPA Study for PCSB-SBO Tembungo Field & PGB PRD Study for PETRONAS Group Wide QRA Study & HSE Case for PCSB-SKO, PCSB-SBO,PCSB-PMO, PCOSB-TO, PCML SHELL – HAZOP Facilitation for B11and South Furious Facility. PC GARRAF – HAZOP & HAZID, GasDispersion Modelling Study, Flare(Toxic) Dispersion Study for GarrafProcessing Plant. Garraf Light OilGas Pipeline HAZOP. SAMUR – Design Safety Review PFLNG –HAZOP input, review ofvarious QRA & Safety Studiesdeliverables. SOGT – Facilitation of HAZOP forSOGT FEED by SAMSUNGEngineering. PCML – HSE Case Update includingHER update, QRAs, MOPO etc.0
HAC Assessment & Review Workshop Provide review and update during plant change/modification (Brownfield Project)Provide HAC Review Workshop (Greenfield Project)HAC review for Pilot Plant & Lab Scale
• API RP 500 and API RP 505 • NFPA 497 and NFPA 499. PETRONAS Technical Standards provides guidelines to ensure proper management of Ex Equipment. 1. Ex Electrical Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Guidelines (Ex IMG) • Standards and Guidelines • Personnel • Inspection • Maintenance 2. Ex Equipment Repair Guidelines (Ex ERG) 3. Ex Management Assessment Guidelines (Ex MAG) 4. Ex ...